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COMPENSATION OF PROMOTERS..
The compensation of promoters for services rendered in secur-
ing subscriptions of stock for a projected corporation, and the
expenses incurred in incorporating a company, presents a ques-
tion concerning which the courts have promulgated various rules.
It would be anomalous to speak of services of a promoter ren-
dered subsequent to the incorporation of a projected corporation.
No rule which will cover the facts in every case has been stated,
but it is generally said, that a corporation is not liable for services
rendered by a promoter, and that this freedom from liability rests
upon the same principal as the freedom from liability on contracts
of promoters entered into in behalf of a projected corporation.,
At the time the services are rendered by the promoter, there is no
corporation in existence, and there being no entity which can re-
ceive the services, there can be no contract on behalf of the cor-
poration to pay for them, a fortiori the corporation cannot be liable
on an implied promise to pay for such services.
Promoters stand in a fiduciary relation to the proposed cor-
poration as a legal entity, and to the individual stockholders.2
Standing in this relation, they must exercise the utmost good faith.
The hardships that would result to the projected corporation, if
promoters were allowed to make contracts, under the terms of
which, they would receive compensation for services performed in
incorporating a company are obvious.
The English courts at an early date recognized, that though
a promoter purport to act on behalf of the projected corporations
he cannot be treated as an agent, there being no nominal principal
then in existence, hence, there is no contractual relation between
the corporation and the -third party. 3 Promoters cannot bind
projected corporations by contracts entered into prior to incor-
poration,-the promoters themselves are liable on these contracts.4
Recognizing the trust relation existing between the promoter
on the one hand, and the corporate entity and the individual stock-
holders on the other, courts have placed every safeguard about
IMarchard vs. Loan etc. Assoc., 26 La. Ann. 389; Weatherford vs. Granger,
86 Tex. 350; Contracts: Van Noy vs. Insur. Co., 168 Mo. App. 287; States
ex rel vs. Bank, 197 Mo. 574; Hill vs. Gould, 129 Mo. 106.
lBrooker vs. Trust Co., 254 Mo. 1. c. 156.
3Bley vs. Assurance Co. Ltd., 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 1909; Kelner vs. Baxter,
L. R. 2 Com. P1. 174; Melheds vs. Ry., L. R. 9 Com. P1. 503.
4Kerridge vs. Hesse, 9 Carr V. P. 200.
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the latter. The corporate entity exists only in contemplation, it
is a creation of the law, and the courts are bound to protect it.
Logically, the promoter of a projected corporation should look
to his associates for compensation and expenses. The fact that
the latter subsequently become the stockholders of the proposed
corporation should not, of itself, be sufficient to associate the cor-
poration with the salary and expenses of the former. It is only
because the associates of the promoter, who are, in nearly all cases,
promoters themselves, subsequently become holders of stock in
the projected corporation, that the corporate entity has been drawn
in the past into controversies concerning compensation of pro-
moters.
Textbooks on the subject of promoters, broadly state the rule
that a corporation is not liable to promoters for compensation.5
Following the statement of the rule, are numerous exceptions, which,
when considered carefully, are clearly not within the purview of
the rule. They are cases in which the courts have had under con-
sideration services rendered to a corporation subsequent to its
incorporation.
In New York & New Haven Railroad Co. vs. Ketchum,' a very
early case, the court discusses, at length, promoters' compensation.
The questions propounded by the Court in this case are of vital
importance in all actions to recover compensation for services
rendered to a projected corporation by promoters. Resorting to
an interrogative form of argument, the Court asks, how stock-
holders can be held liable for incumbrances which they had no
voice in creating? How these services can be said to have been
rendered at the request of the company when there was no com-
pany in existence? How a few persons can combine and agree
with one of their number that he shall receive large commissions
for doing work for an entity which is not in existence? The court
then discusses the breach of faith toward the stockholders, who
pay the charter price of their stock, and who expect to take it free
from incumbrances other than those recited in subscription blanks.
These are the inquiries which should be brought to the attention
of every court when considering questions concerning compensation
of promoters.
The services of a promoter are of illusory value to the cor-
porate entity under any circumstances, and the confidence reposed
57 R. C. E. 54.
ON. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. vs. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 179.
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in a promoter by the projected corporation should never be used
for personal profit.
It is universally recognized that a corporation is not bound
by contracts made in its behalf, prior to its incorporation. Some
broad statements have been made to the effect that a corporation
may ratify these contracts. However, courts have recognized the
fallacy of this expression, and, in recent cases, have stated more
conservatively that corporations may ratify contracts made prior
to incorporation, if, at the time of the ratification, there is in fact
a making of a new contract. Ratification presupposes a power
to make at the time the contract was entered into, and, there being
no corporate entity then in existence, there consequently cannot
be a subsequent ratification.7
There are two early cases which seem to uphold the theory
that a company is liable for services rendered prior to the incor-
porating of the company.8 The more recent of the two accepts
the earlier one as controling its decision. This early case, while
broadly stating that the corporation is liable for these services, is
inconsistent in its holdings, in that, recovery is refused for ser-
vices rendered voluntarily, on the grounds that there is no sub-
sequent promise to pay for them and that there could be no prev-
ious promise, as, at the time of the rendition of these services, there
was no one capable of making a promise. The court then holds
that the corporation is liable for services rendered in procuring stock
subscriptions necessary for a full organization of the company,
though there is no expressed promise for their payment, the services
being necessary, it is stated that the promise for their payment
would be implied. The court looses sight of the fact that there
was no corporate entity at the time the stock was susbscribed, to
accept the services, or promise to pay for them. In this case,
however, it appears that there was a vote taken, subsequent to the
incorporation of the company, for the payment of these services.
This vote closely resembles the attempt frequently made by cor-
porations to pay their directors for past services, which, it is recog-
nized, is giving away corporate property without just compensation.
This question was not brought to the attention of the court and
was not passed on by it.
Many attempts have been made to follow the decisions in these
early cases without following their reasoning. In these attempts
7Royal Casualty Co. vs. Puller, 186 S. W. 1099.
'Low vs. R. R. Co., 45 N. H. 370; Hall vs. R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 401 (1856).
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the courts say that the corporation by accepting the stock sub-
scriptions, receives the benefit of a contract made in its behalf, and
must take it subject to the burdens. The question then arises,
what burdens should be assumed by the corporation?
Mr. Lindley, L. J.9
"If I order a coat and receive it, I get the benefit of the
labor of the cloth manufacturer, but does anyone dream that
I am under any liability to him? It is a mere fallacy to say
that, because a person gets the benefit of work done by some-
one, he is liable to pay the person who does the work."
This argument is pertinent to the question of compensation
to be received by a promoter. The stock subscriptions obtained
by a promoter are not obtained at the solicitation and request of
the corporate entity, and when the corporate entity does receive
the money invested for stocks by stockholders, it does so under
a contract with the stockholder. Because the promoter induced
the stockholder to invest this money, it does not necessarily follow
that the corporation, by accepting it, becomes liable to the pro-
moter for his services in procuring it. If a corporation accepted
these services, with a burden to pay the promoter for his services,
then every contract entered into between contracting parties, might
be subject to a burden unknown to one of the parties.
There can be no estoppel on the part of the corporation because
it accepts stock subscriptions. A refusal on its part would
require an entity, and, without stock subscriptions, there exists
no entity. How can the corporation be estopped by accepting
benefits which it has no power to reject without undercreating
itself?'0
The case of Cushion Heel Shoe Co. vs. Hartt,n is the most recent
case on the question of compensation of promoters. In this case
the plaintiff, who was experienced in the manufacture of shoes,
inserted in a shoe journal, an advertisement for a shoe factory to
locate in the City of Fort Wayne. He received an answer from
a man named Johnson, who was the patentee of a certain cushion
heel shoe. Subscription lists were prepared, and the plaintiff
sought subscriptions. The plaintiff testified that he had been
promised the position of Superintendent when the factory was es-
tablished, and that he would be paid for his time and his ex.
penses in securing stock subscriptions. The Company was or_
9Re Rotterham Alum vs. C. Co., 50 L. T. Rep. N. S. 219.
1010 Cyc. 264.
21103 N. E. 1063 (Ind. Sup. Ct.)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1/iss4/2
COMPENSATION OF PROMOTERS.
ganized, and, subsequent to its incorporation, plaintiff told the
directors and officers that he expected to be paid for his services.
It was not shown that the Board of Directors ever acted on plaintiff's
claim. Plaintiff contended that, by accepting the results of his
services, and receiving the benefits thereof, the defendant was
bound, by an implied contract, to pay for such services. It was
held that, certainly, under ordinary circumstances, a corporation
is not bound by contracts made for its benefit by promoters until
ratification, either expressed or implied, after its organization;
that an implied contract is limited in its application to contracts
in which the promoters are interested, but that the promoters, in
dealing with the corporation, must act openly and in good faith,
as the promoter stands in a fiduciary relation to the corporation as
a legal entity and to its individual stockholders, with respect to
their property rights in their stock. That this relation requires a
full disclosure of the remuneration the promoter is to receive, and,
upon failing to disclose it, he is guilty of fraud and cannot honestly
receive any remuneration for his services. That the stockholders
are entitled to take their stock free from incumbrances placed
upon it at a time when they had no voice in creating the same, and
that there is no estoppel, as the corporation must receive stock
subscriptions in order to incorporate and before incorporation, there
is no entity which can reject the services.
The Court, in this case, speaks of a ratification of contracts,
using the term in a limited sense, there being in fact no ratification
because of the previous inability to enter into a contract. The
subsequent act of the corporation being the making of a new con-
tract, all the elements of a contract being present.
The confusion which results from general statements made
by courts, relative to compensation to promoters, is illustrated by
the case of Taussig vs. Railroad,12 a case in which the Court had
under consideration the payment of a director for services rendered
partly before incorporation and without an agreement. It is stated
that, where services are rendered under such circumstances as to
raise a fair presumption that the officer intended or understood
that they were to be paid for, or ought to have so understood the
Company, on receiving such services, is liable to pay the reason-
able value for the same. The Court does not discuss or consider
that, where services are rendered and there is no entity to receive
V
11Taussig vs. R. R., 166 Mo. 29.
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the same or no one capable of understanding that they should be
paid for, there, logically, can be no recovery.
This is an action for professional services rendered immediately
before, and subsequent to incorporation. The opinion contains
a lengthy discussion of the rights of officers or directors of acor-
poration to recover for services not within the scope of their office
and a closing statement that payment for the services rendered
prior to the incorporation of the Company may be recovered on
an implied contract.
This latter proposition is stated generally, but not in such
terms as to allow recovery for services where the promoter does
not appear as a contracting party, as services rendered in securing
stock subscriptions. The services rendered prior to incorporation
in this case are analogous to the sale of property by a promoter to
the corporation. The promoter appears in the contract, express
or implied, and the corporation has a knowledge of his existence
and his rights, and if he deals openly and in good faith with the
corporation, there is no reason why he should not recover. Com-
pensation to him in this instance is a burden which should follow
the contract. The Court does not discuss nor did it have before
it the question of compensation where the promoter does not ap-
pear as a contracting party, where the promoter merely induced
a party to contract with the corporation. Nevertheless, this
case is cited in a recent publication as authority for the proposi-
tion, that a corporation must take the benefits of "contracts of pro-
moters subject to the burders.13 This, in a restricted and limited
sense, is true, but only when it appears that the promoter is a con-
tracting party. In cases where the promoter does not appear as
a contracting party, the corporation can not by making a
contract, be obliged to perform a burden unknown to it at the
time of making the said contract.
A brief survey of the cases, an example of each being cited
leads to the conclusion that the rule, that a corporation is not liable
for the services of a promoter, should be strictly adhered to, and
in no case should the courts deviate from this rule. The promoter
has a cause of action against his associates, if they refuse to com-
pensate him for the expenses incurred and services rendered in the
incorporation of a company. They are the ones he should look
to for compensation. The honest unsuspecting stockholders, who
pay a fair price for their stock should not take it encumbered with
• u7 R. C. L. 54.
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a burden unknown to them, and the corporate entity should not
be required to pay for a service which it could not solicit or request,
and which it, by becoming an entity accept.
BOAZ B. WATKINS.
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